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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://lrcdrs.bennett.edu.in:80/handle/123456789/2076
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dc.contributor.authorChandra, Dr.Saurabh-
dc.date.accessioned2024-02-12T04:19:50Z-
dc.date.available2024-02-12T04:19:50Z-
dc.date.issued2023-08-
dc.identifier.citationCMRU JCLA Volume 5 Issue 2en_US
dc.identifier.issn2582-4805-
dc.identifier.urihttp://lrcdrs.bennett.edu.in:80/handle/123456789/2076-
dc.description.abstractCartels are the most egregious of all anti competitive behaviours and the ultimate antitrust evil. 2 To combat the increasing number of cartels that are disrupting fair markets and encouraging unfair practises such as price hikes, output limits, and credit restrictions, the Indian government has, to some extent, effectively adopted the subordinate legislation of Leniency Provisions. Due to their clandestine operations and stringent enforcement, cartel agreements are difficult to recognise. However, cartel members believe that the danger of punishment outweighs the advantages of engaging in illegal activity when substantial monetary penalties are in place. As a result, they are compelled to reveal their anti-competitive activities.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherCMR University Journal for Contemporary Legal Affairsen_US
dc.subjectMarketen_US
dc.subjectCompetitionen_US
dc.subjectCartelen_US
dc.subjectWhistle bloweren_US
dc.subjectLeniency Programmeen_US
dc.titleEffectiveness of Whistle blower and Leniency Programme in Detecting and Preventing Cartelsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.indexedUGCCLen_US
Appears in Collections:Journal Articles_SOL

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